

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATIONCopy 10 of 11 CopiesRELATIONSHIP OF GENERAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS TO PROGRESS
IN FIELDS OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTSPreface

The pre-1947 historical period of attempts to regulate and reduce armed forces and armaments served to place in relief the determining influence which the general atmosphere and ability to settle major political matters had on negotiations. That influence, helpful or hindering, and more often the latter than the former, was plainly visible in the following negotiations which served to mold official US thinking on the relationship between general political settlements and progress in the fields of reduction of armed forces and armaments:

- 1) Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817;
- 2) Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907;
- 3) Washington Conference of 1921-2;
- 4) London Conference of 1930;
- 5) Paris Peace Conference (disarmament discussions) in 1919;
- 6) League of Nations (disarmament discussions) until 1936;
- 7) Geneva Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927;
- 8) London Naval Conference of 1935-6.

Since the autumn of 1947 both confidential papers and authoritative public utterances have set forth the United States position on the subject.

The papers consist of:

- 1) NSC 68, April 4, 1950; Annex VIII, to NSC 68/1, (Political Section, Draft), September 10, 1950; NSC 68/2, September 30, 1950; NSC 68/4, December 14, 1950;

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- 2) NSC 112, July 6, 1951 Progress Report on NSC 112, January 29, 1952;
- 3) NSC 114/2, October 1951;
- 4) Statement submitted to the President by the Secretaries of Defense and State, October 24, 1951 together with the tripartite proposals to reduce armed forces and armaments.

The utterances consist of:

- 1) Secretary of State Marshall's address to the GA, Sept. 17, 1947;
- 2) Secretary of State Acheson's speech at Berkeley, California, March 16, 1950;
- 3) President Truman's declaration to the GA, October 24, 1950;
- 4) President Truman's broadcast, November 7, 1951;
- 5) Secretary of State Acheson's endorsement of the tripartite proposals to the GA, November 8, 1951;
- 6) Secretary of State Acheson's elucidation of the proposals to Committee I of the GA, November 19, 1951.

While both the papers and the utterances — given in the last paragraph — are often ambiguous, there is a thread of consistency which affirms: (i) that reduction of armed forces and armaments is related to progress toward settlement of major political issues between the Soviet bloc and the free world, (ii) that actual reduction of armaments and armed forces cannot be commenced without substantial progress toward concurrent settlement of major political issues, (iii) but that discussion of plans for reducing armed forces and armaments should take place now and that agreement on such plans should greatly aid settlement of the major political issues. In other words, progress on plans for disarmament should aid in settling

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settling major political issues and vice versa; actual reduction of armed forces and armaments must be related to substantial progress toward concurrent settlement of major political issues.

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Historical Background

The pre-World War II events which have done most to condition the thinking in the US Government on the subject of arms regulation and reduction are: 1) the limited successes in the regulation and reduction of naval armaments achieved at the Washington Conference of 1921-2 and at the London Conference of 1930, and 2) the failure of the other conferences and discussions which took place from 1899 onward to achieve many tangible results in the arms regulation field. Their only tangible achievements were the imposition, for a time, of limits on the armaments and armed forces of nations defeated during World War I, and the conclusion of agreements not to employ certain kinds of weapons or not to commit certain acts in time of war. The conferences and discussions with only meager results include the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the disarmament discussions which began at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and went on intermittently under League of Nations auspices until 1936, the Geneva Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927, and the London Naval Conference of 1935-6. In spite of the conclusion at the last named conference of a treaty between the US, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and France, the conference must be classed as a failure because of the ineffectiveness of that treaty as an arms-regulation measure.

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The conclusion in 1817 of the Rush-Bagot Agreement virtually demilitarizing the Great Lakes is another pre-World War II success which deserves mention because of the influence it has exerted on thinking in this Government on the subject of arms regulation. The following factors apparently contributed significantly to the conclusion of the Rush-Bagot agreement: It was proposed by the US during the period of peace which followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent in which a number of differences between the US and Great Britain were settled. The US would have been able to outdistance the British in a naval armaments race on the Great Lakes but wished to avoid the cost of doing so or of maintaining any forces there beyond those needed to enforce the revenue laws. Neither government then felt it necessary to maintain on the Lake forces stronger than those maintained by the other. Conclusion of the agreement was a matter which rested entirely with the US and the British governments.

The negotiation at the Washington Conference of 1921-2 of the treaty limiting and reducing the size of the battleship-battle-cruiser and the aircraft-carrier components of the US, British Empire, Japanese, French, and Italian navies and the amounts of new construction in those categories is undoubtedly the outstanding accomplishment of modern times in the arms-regulation field. But it should not be forgotten that in spite of a US proposal that the limitation of land armaments be considered at the conference, no negotiations on that very difficult subject were undertaken; that although an attempt was made to achieve agreement limiting all types of naval armament, limitation agreements were concluded with respect to only the battleship-battle-cruiser and the aircraft carrier categories; and that as regards those types of vessel, many people questioned the value

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cruiser
of the battleship and the battle ~~ships~~, thinking that both were likely soon to be made obsolete by developments in air and submarine warfare, and doubted the value of the newly developed and highly vulnerable aircraft carrier.

When that conference began, a dangerous state of tension existed between the US and Japan; and the US, the British Empire, and Japan were engaged in a naval armaments race, particularly in the battleship-battle-cruiser category. The following factors (not listed in order of importance) presumably contributed significantly to the relatively successful outcome of the conference:

- 1) All five of the states which then possessed or had pretensions to large naval strength, together with the dominions which contributed to British naval strength, were represented at the conference.
- 2) While each of the five major powers represented wished to maintain its capital-ship strength relative to one or more of the others, and some wished to increase it, no serious tensions calling for efforts by those powers to out-build each other in capital ships then existed between any of them except the US and Japan. France and Italy were less interested in the construction of capital ships than in the construction of other types.
- 3) The US possessed greater naval strength than any other state except Great Britain; it had a larger battleship and battle-cruiser building program than the latter; and it was in a

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far better financial position than any of the others to carry out an expensive naval building program and to maintain a large navy. The US possessed strategically situated, though only partially developed, naval base sites in the Pacific. It was therefore negotiating from a position of great relative strength, especially with regard to capital-ship limitation.

- 4) During the negotiations the US took the initiative in offering to make generous concessions for the sake of agreement and showed a willingness to compromise.
- 5) The negotiations at the conference were not confined to the subject of armaments. An effort was made, largely at US initiative, to work out a settlement of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, which would be acceptable to all interested nations and would make possible and include an agreement regulating and reducing naval armaments. Subjects with reference to which agreements were consequently reached at the conference included China; insular possessions and insular dominions of the US, Great Britain, Japan, and France in the Pacific; termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and construction of naval base facilities and fortifications in the Pacific.
- 6) The doubts which existed concerning the value of battleships, battle-cruisers, and aircraft carriers, and which probably contributed to the willingness of the parties to agree on limitations and reductions in those categories, have already been mentioned.

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The Geneva Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927, which adjourned without any positive agreement because of the inability of the United States and the United Kingdom to find a formula equating vessels mounting eight inch guns with vessels having six inch guns, is generally regarded as having failed because of the technical difficulty of achieving any limitation of cruiser tonnage without prior settlement of political differences. President Coolidge's invitation to the Conference had limited it to the consideration of technical aspects of disarmament, but the problem which was really involved was the maritime relations between the British Empire and the United States. This particular problem was not capable of solution by experts, who could not find technical justification for political purposes. The invitation to the Conference appeared to abandon the method used during the 1921-2 Naval Conference of considering the level of armaments as only one threat in a tangled web of political relationships.

The London Naval Conference of 1930 was more successful than the Washington Conference of 1921-2 in one important respect: it extended the regulation of naval armaments to cover cruisers, destroyers, and submarines as well as capital ships. But this coverage applied only to the US, British Commonwealth, and Japanese navies, and the agreement continued in effect only until the end of 1936. The following factors (noted in order of importance) presumably contributed significantly to the conclusion of the London Treaty of 1930:

- 1) The US, the British Commonwealth, and Japan remained reasonably well satisfied with the Pacific and Far Eastern settlement reached at the Washington Conference in 1921-2.

- 2) The

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- 2) The conclusion in 1928 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact had helped to create an atmosphere favorable to agreement on the limitation of naval armaments.
- 3) The conference was preceded by meetings between President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald, both of whom strongly desired that agreement should be reached, and by extended preliminary discussions between the governments of the US and of the UK.
- 4) Japan was allowed more favorable ratios of strength in cruisers destroyers, and submarines than it had obtained in capital ships.
- 5) Neither the US nor the UK was so sensitive of national security requirements as they have since been forced to become. Views then held pretty widely, at least in the English-speaking world, were: that not to try to build up a nation's armed strength to match the strength of possible adversaries would contribute to the maintenance of peace better than to build up armed strength and that wars and national armaments resulted largely from the scheming of armaments manufacturers.

The successes, such as they were, achieved at the Washington Conference and at the London Conference of 1930 were evidently achieved by narrow margins. In the cases of the Washington, London (both 1930 and 1936), and Rush-Bagot agreements each of the parties considered the agreement to be acceptable from a national security standpoint and believed that the national interest would on the whole be better served by concluding it

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than by not doing so. Thus, the political atmosphere aided reaching agreement on plans for armaments reduction. These are the only instances in instances in which these pre-requisites to the adoption of an effective arms regulation plan have been fulfilled — and of those four agreements the London Treaty of 1935 proved to be entirely ineffective as an arms-control measure, and the London Treaty of 1930 ceased to be effective at the end of 1936.

An authoritative statement naming or indicating obstacles which must be surmounted to bring about the conclusion of an effective arms-regulation agreement appears in the Preliminary Report on the Work of the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments which began in 1932. This report was prepared by Mr. Arthur Henderson, the President of the Conference, not long before his death in October 1935. The quotations which follow are excerpted from the "Introduction" of the Report:

"The armed forces of a country are considered as the most obvious expression of its sovereignty and independence.

"The limitation of armaments, moreover, cannot be considered as an isolated problem. Disarmament is only one aspect of an organized peace system, and experience in dealing with the problem before and during the Conference has clearly shown that an effort to limit and reduce armaments necessarily entails the discussion of much wider political problems. It soon became obvious that the Conference would have to face the problem of collaboration in the political field between Members and non-Members of the League, a harmonization of the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the elaboration of a collective system for the preservation of peace.

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"In addition to these general difficulties inherent in the problem of disarmament, there were special difficulties [during the Conference] created by ... serious events in the Far East, ... two serious armed conflicts [in South America], ... the most serious and widespread economic and financial crisis in history, ... [and] numerous important political developments which took place in many countries while the Conference was in session. ... All these events, creating as they did a general uneasiness, struck at the roots of mutual confidence between nations and troubled the atmosphere of the Conference from the very start."

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NSC No. 68, of April 4, 1950, sets forth a possible insistence upon at least some concurrent, if not, prior settlements before proceeding to carry out agreements for reduction in armed forces and armaments.

- 1) "...at least a major change in the relative power positions of the US and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control" (of atomic energy) "could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable."
- (Page 42)
- 2) "...For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State could be only a tactic. Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a

start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be

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desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war." (Page 45)

- 3) "Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's ..., "the Soviet Union "will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve ... major objectives. It is unlikely that the Franklin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions." (Page 46)

- 4) "...We will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the US than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons ... This seems to indicate that for the time being the US and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan, and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites... To the extent that the US and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable." (Page 47)

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- 5) This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up. (Page 64)

The foregoing was reaffirmed in NSC 68/2, September 30, 1950, paragraph 10.

- 6) "The ... issues are sometimes discussed as mileposts of a course - as if destined to be resolved in predeterminable order ... Rather than the milepost metaphor, the more useful analogy is that of a diamond ... Each facet is related to all other facets ... "(Pages 78-79, Annex VIII to NSC 68/1).

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- 7) "The most to be expected is acceptance by both parties of a *modus vivendi*...Illustration of what...a *modus vivendi* might comprise, the following are suggested: (a) an effective system of control of armaments, including atomic and bacteriological weapons; (b) cessation of all current armed aggression, whether across frontiers or internal; (c) evacuation of Austria, and in Germany a tolerable arrangement which would ... open the way for eventual peaceful unification on a democratic basis; (d) a substantial reduction in hostile propaganda and some increase in the flow of information through the Iron Curtain... we could hardly ask for less as requisite to a slackening in rearmament, very probably it would be necessary to ask for more." (Page 80, Annex VIII to NSC 68/1).
- 8) "Present conditions make unacceptable the delay involved in the phasing of our military build-up over a four-year period. It is evident that the forces envisaged earlier for 1954 must be provided as an interim program as rapidly as practicable and with a target date no later than June 30, 1952. We must also proceed at once to establish a production and mobilization base that will permit a very rapid expansion to full mobilization. Such a course is essential in order for us to build rapidly a military strength capable of fulfilling our two fundamental obligations: (a) Protection against disaster; and (b) support of our foreign policy. (NSC 68/4, para 4)."
- 9) "NSC 112, dated July 6, 1951, and the first progress report on this document contain statements throwing light upon the relationships between proposals that the United States might make for reduction of armed forces and armaments and those for general political settlements. NSC 112 declares:

"j. If

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- "j. If armed force can be so limited that resort to its use as an instrument of national policy would be much less likely, the conflict between the intentions of the West and the Soviet orbit might be resolved through other means;" ("Conclusions", page 8).
- "1. ...issues include such specific political questions as Germany and Austria as well as the general causes of tension in Europe. The excessive size of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites is symptomatic of these tensions. The wide range of these issues indicates that the US will be confronted with the necessity of developing broad proposals with respect to armed forces and armaments in order to assist in the possible settlement of specific political issues." (Annex "A", page 11).
- "10. The US is handicapped in negotiating with the USSR by the disparity of armed forces and armaments in Europe. If the US is in a position to make proposals with respect to regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, in which the initiation of a continuing system of inspection to verify disclosure is the necessary first step, then the US could make concurrent proposals for acceptable solutions to such outstanding political problems as Germany and Austria. The proposals for specific political settlements would be conditioned upon agreement to such a plan for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments." (Annex "A", page 13).
- "30. In short, before any general limitation on reduction can be carried out by the West, the Soviet Union and its satellites will have to reduce their total armed strength until the level of armaments

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between East and West is more nearly equal or the West will have to bring the effectiveness of its armed strength up to the level of the East."

Policy Planning Staff Paper Entitled "Manner of Advancing Disarmament Proposal on Basis of NSC 112, October 16, 1951.

"1. The outstanding issues in Europe between the West and the Soviet Union include such specific political questions as Germany and Austria, withdrawal of military forces to the Soviet borders, as well as general causes of tension, and it has been felt for some time that the range of these issues necessitates the development of broad proposals with respect to armed forces and armaments in order to place the possible settlement of specific political issues in the proper context.

"2. Further, there is a need to make clear to the American people and to the peoples of Western countries generally that their governments have in mind a sound and reasonable approach to the problem of the regulation of armed forces and armaments as one element in a broad program to ease tensions. This can be useful both to forestall utopian and otherwise less sound approaches to the armaments problem and to encourage confidence that governments of the West are thinking and planning ahead for better times.

"3. The West needs time to build its defenses. It is therefore vital to prevent the Kremlin from making up its mind that a general war at an early date is its best hope. This calls not only for a program of strength but for keeping open the processes of negotiation and, in serious vein, holding out to the Kremlin a program for easing tensions, in other words, holding out an alternative to war. Armaments proposals are a necessary element in such a program."

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The first progress report on NSC 112 is dated January 29, 1952, and treats the subject of relationship in the following quotation from Appendix A, which contains the "Outline of Program for Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and Armaments" submitted to the President on October 24, 1951:

- "2. ...all States should consider seriously whether steps can be taken to find ways of easing the armaments burden as methods are found to bring about peace and international tensions are relaxed. Discussions on this subject can begin now." (Page 6).
- "6. Concurrently with putting such a system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments into force, there can and must be settlement of major political issues which have divided the world." (Page 6).

On October 24, 1951, the Secretaries of Defense and State submitted to the President, together with the Program for Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of all Armed Forces and Armaments, the following appraisal:

"... the development of international tensions ... "(Has) "imposed upon the world a constantly growing burden of armaments...It is obvious that a program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments can make no progress while actual fighting continues in Korea and international tensions are high."

NSC 7), a priority project, has been divided into two parts: "A statement of United States and allied war objectives in the event of a global war;" "A statement of the conditions the United States would be willing to accept for a peaceful settlement with the USSR, including a plan for

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the reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces." The latest communication on the subject is a letter from G (Bohlen) to S/P (Witze) on April 28, 1952, asking comments and advice on progress in dealing with these subjects [NSC status of projects, dated April 28, 1952, page 6, referring to meetings of the NSC Senior Staff February 23, 1951, May 24, 1951 and November 20, 1951, which agreed this matter should be completed as a priority project, and noted that NSC 112 was the first step toward completion of this project and that further work would proceed in the light of Council action on NSC 112.]

UNCLASSIFIEDAuthoritative Public Utterances

On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall told the GA:

"....it is the conviction of my Government that a workable system for the regulation of armaments cannot be put into operation until conditions of international confidence prevail.The regulation of armaments presupposes enough international understanding to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy.

"Nevertheless, we believe it is important not to delay the formulation of a system of arms regulation for implementation when conditions permit."

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The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments incorporated the views expressed by General Marshall in a resolution adopted August 12, 1948.

"2. A system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which would follow the establishment of the necessary degree of confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so justify further measures of regulation and reduction.

"3. Examples of conditions essential to such confidence and security are:

(a) The establishment of an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Until the agreed forces are pledged to the Security Council an essential step in establishing a system of collective security will not have been taken.

(b) The establishment of an international control of atomic energy. It is a basic assumption of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments that the Atomic Energy Commission will make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(c) The conclusion of the peace settlements with Germany and Japan. Conditions of international peace and security will not be fully established until measures have been agreed upon which will prevent these States from undertaking aggressive action in the future."

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[CCA Second Progress Report, UNDec 8/1371, Aug. 9,
1949, page 3 and para 20]

On March 16, 1950, at Berkeley, California, Secretary of State Acheson declared, among other things, that the USSR should participate in finding an acceptable means to free the world from the destructive tensions and anxieties which had beset it; and he suggested the following as the points of greatest difference which sooner or later must be reconciled if US and USSR systems were to live together at least in reasonable security:

- 1) Austria, Germany and Japan. — The USSR should join in making treaties of peace with these countries which would not make Soviet satellites of them.
- 2) Far East Generally. — The USSR should bring about relaxation of pressures there, especially in Korea; settle Jap POW question; and cease to try to subvert newly independent states.
- 3) European Satellite Area. — The USSR should withdraw military and police forces from its satellite states, and refrain from using the shadow of these forces to intimidate the peoples in them.
- 4) UN. — The USSR should abandon policy of obstruction and act as if it believed in the Organization.
- 5) Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments. — The USSR should join in seeking realistic and effective systems of control and limitation.
- 6) Indirect Aggression. — The USSR should cease to use Communist apparatus to attempt to subvert established governments with which the Soviet Union has overt relations implying friendship and respect.

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- 7) Foreign Diplomats. — The USSR should cooperate in mutual treatment of official representatives of all countries with decency and respect, and in creating atmosphere in which they could function in a normal and helpful manner.
- 8) Distortion of Foreign Motives. — The USSR should refrain from systematically distorting to peoples of USSR the picture of the non-Soviet world, the US in particular.

On October 24, 1950 President Truman declared to the NA:

"The UN...provides a way through which, once the danger of aggression is reduced, the nations can be relieved of the burden of armaments...we must continue to strive, through the UN, to achieve international control of atomic energy and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Cooperative and effective disarmament would make the danger of war remote... At the same time we have an equally solemn obligation to continue our efforts to find solutions to the major problems and issues that divide the nations. ..." (that) "would make possible a truly dependable and effective system for the reduction and control of armaments."

On November 7, 1951 the President broadcast a declaration about the tripartite proposals for reduction of arms and armaments, which included the following:

"In making our proposal for reducing armaments, we are not suggesting that the crisis in world affairs has passed, or even that it has lessened. It has not. While aggression and fighting continue -- as in Korea -- and while the major

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political issues that divide the nations remain unsettled, real progress toward reducing armaments may not be possible... We believe deeply that discussions...in the UN can and should begin now, even though tensions are high. Indeed, one way to reduce these tensions is to start work on such proposals as the ones we are now making."

On November 8, 1951, in speaking of the tripartite proposals on arms and armament reduction, Secretary of State Acheson told the GA that the US believed ~~that~~ that no general program for reduction of arms and armaments could be put into effect while UN forces were resisting aggression in Korea; and that, moreover, concurrently with the coming into effect of the program, the major political issues which have divided the world "can and must be settled". He added that the areas in which the USSR could by action demonstrate its desire for peace were: Korea, Germany, Austria, Italy (by withdrawing its objections to entry of Italy into the UN), and the matter of human rights (in which the UN Charter expresses a profound interest). A few days later, while addressing Committee I of the GA on November 19 on the same subject, the Secretary, by the following declaration, apparently tried to portray a less rigid relationship between general political settlements and arms reduction than he had on November 8:

"I believe that these proposals, if accepted, could and would produce a ... point at which the world could turn back from the tensions, the dangers....could relax the effort towards armament...and by doing so could find a way to solve some of the greatest questions which divide East and West.... It is quite clear, for instance, that there can be no system, no general treaty for the reduction of armaments can go on and

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in Korea...there is no reason if actual fighting can be stopped why the system of disclosure and verification cannot be put into effect....there must obviously be some connection between the solution of great problems, the reduction of tensions and the reduction of armaments.

"That does not mean that we are suggesting that there are any unexpressed conditions that this problem or that problem or some other problem must be solved before this goes into effect. But....if, at the time this system of reduction of armaments is worked out, we are in a period of highly mounting tensions and additional frictions throughout the world, it is highly unlikely that nations would enter into a system of armaments reduction.

"On the other hand, the very working out of such a system, the very working out and implementation of disclosure and verification will in itself help to reduce these tensions and help us to find solutions for problems which now seem very difficult to us....there is a direct relation between the ability to put into effect a system of disarmament and the international temperature....If it has reduced so that solutions of problems are on the way..., then disarmament becomes a wholly different thing so far as the immediate future is concerned."

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Conclusions

The position of the United States concerning the relationship between general political settlements and progress in the reduction of armed forces and armaments may be summarized as follows:

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1. The various attempts to regulate and reduce armed forces and armaments prior to World War II gave clear evidence of the inter-relationship in fact between disarmament and a favorable international political atmosphere. In view of United States interest and participation in many of these attempts at regulation and reduction, this inter-relationship has materially affected the views of the United States concerning disarmament in the post-war period. However, the United States in this period did not subscribe to the French thesis that security must precede disarmament.

2. In 1947 through 1950, a concept of "conditions precedent" was adhered to:-i.e., the United States insisted that a workable system for regulation of armaments and armed forces could not ^{bc} put into effect until "conditions of international confidence prevail." These conditions, generally speaking, included:

a. Settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, and evacuation of Austria.

b. Implementation of Article 43 Agreements placing military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council.

c. International agreement for control of atomic energy. (It should be noted that during this period atomic energy control was considered as separate from problems of non-atomic arms and armed forces.)

d. Cessation of all current armed aggression, including internal subversion, by the Soviets.

e. Cooperation in the United Nations.

f. Substantial

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f. Substantial reduction in hostile propaganda and some increase in freedom of information behind the Iron Curtain.

In fact, it was presumed that these "conditions precedent" were dependent on a balancing of power between the Soviet bloc and the free world, brought about by building up the strength of the free world.

Secretary Marshall's speech before the General Assembly, September 17, 1947; August 12, 1948, UN Resolution; Secretary Acheson's March 16, 1950 speech at Berkeley, California; NSC 62, April 4, 1950.⁷

3. Since November 7, 1951, the concept of "conditions concurrent" or "simultaneous progress" has prevailed. By this meant:

a. Cessation of fighting as in Korea is the sole designated condition precedent to putting into effect a disarmament program. Settling the major political issues between the Soviet bloc and the West is no longer spoken of as a condition precedent to actual disarmament, but as conditions to be effected concurrently with actual implementation of a disarmament program. This is primarily a difference of emphasis which recognizes the equal and mutual interplay between political settlements and disarmament, without assigning priority to the former as in the 1947-1950 period. Presumably, then, major political issues include those described in paragraph 2 above, plus necessary settlements in the Far East (Chinese representation, Formosa, Indochina, stabilization of areas of Chinese Communist pressure such as Burma and Malaya).

b. Since

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b. Since agreement upon a disarmament program would of itself materially help reduce international tensions and aid reaching a settlement of the major political issues, discussion of disarmament should be carried on without awaiting a favorable political atmosphere. In particular, (i) agreement upon and putting into effect the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification should help to reduce these tensions, and (ii) disclosure and verification, an indispensable first step in putting into effect any general program for reduction and limitation, provides a good test of Soviet intentions and willingness to live up to international commitments.

c. As progress is made toward agreement on regulation of armaments, presumably efforts would be made to settle other political issues.

/NSC 112, July 6, 1951; First Progress Report of
NSC 112, January 29, 1952; S/P Paper of October 16,
1951; President Truman's speech of November 7, 1951;
Secretary Acheson's Statement of November 19, 1951
before the Political Committee of the General Assembly/

4. The implementation of a policy based upon the concept of "conditions concurrent" or "simultaneous progress" involves a number of inherent conditions:

a. Until an approximate balance of military power between the Soviets and the West has been reached, the Soviet Union cannot be expected to desire to reach any agreements for limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments which would also be acceptable to the United States (NSC 112, Annex A, par. 30).

b. Despite

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4. Despite the present imbalance of power, the processes of negotiation between the USSR and the West should be kept open and a program for easing tensions should be offered as an alternative to war. This is necessary in order to encourage the peoples of the West that their governments are planning for such peaceful settlements, and also through keeping the door open for settlements, to lessen the possibility that the Soviet Union might undertake a general war at an early date. While disarmament proposals are a necessary element in such a program for easing tensions, negotiations on the major political issues are also vital elements in this program. (Policy Planning Staff Paper, October 16, 1951, paras. 1-3).

5. No policy papers exist at present on the political agreements which the United States would be willing to accept for peaceful settlement with the Soviets, but this is a priority project. (NSC 79, NSC Status of Projects, April 28, 1952, page 6; Letter from C (Bohlen) to S/P (Nitze), April 28, 1952).

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